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Abstract 
 
Using local administrative data from 1826 to 1936, we document the evolution of crime rates 
in 19th century France and we estimate the impact of a negative income shock on crime. Our 
identification strategy exploits the phylloxera crisis. Between 1863 and 1890, phylloxera 
destroyed about 40% of French vineyards. We use the geographical variation in the timing of 
this shock to identify its impact on property and violent crime rates, as well as minor offences. 
Our estimates suggest that the phylloxera crisis caused a substantial increase in property crime 
rates and a significant decrease in violent crimes. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic theory and casual observation both suggest that bad economic conditions, 
economic crises and poverty may favour criminal activity as they alter the opportunity costs 
to engage into crime. At the same time, higher crime rates are likely to have a negative impact 
on economic growth as the prevalence of crime in an area discourages business. Thus, crime 
and bad economic conditions may reinforce each other so that countries may be stuck in a 
high crime - low growth equilibrium. This might be particularly true in developing countries 
where, in the absence of social safety net, people falling into poverty during an economic 
crisis might be pushed to commit crime to survive. Despite intuitive this relation is far from 
easy to document due to standard endogeneity problems. Moreover, analysing the issue 
requires reliable data on crime records, matched with information on relevant economic 
variables and both these variables are not easily available for developing countries for a 
sufficient number of years. In order to single out the causal impact of negative shocks to the 
economy on crime rates, ideally we would like to observe a comparable set of developing 
countries or administrative units within a country over a long period of time and we would 
like to treat randomly some of them inducing negative economic shocks. On top of such an 
ideal experiment we would like to have reliable data on crime rates with both time and spatial 
variation. In this paper, we claim that 19th century France provides such an ideal setting. 
We resort to uniquely rich data on criminal records collected between 1826 and 1936 by the 
French Ministry of Justice at the département level (a geographical area roughly equal in size 
to a US county). These data are unique and represent to the best of our knowledge the oldest 
national official administrative crime record exploited by researchers up to today. To identify 
the impact of a negative economic shock on crime, we take advantage of the phylloxera crisis 
that burst in France in the second half of the 19th century. The phylloxera (an aphid which 
attacks vines' roots) destroyed about 40 per cent of vines in France, thus inducing a large 
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productivity shock in an economy still largely dependent on agricultural production1. 
According to historical research, this turned into a major income shock for a number of 
reasons. First, the decrease in wine production was not matched, by far, by an equivalent 
increase in wine prices. Second, the reduction in wine-generated income did not trigger a 
substantial substitution of wine for other agricultural products. Eventually, in some 
départements, the crisis was so strong as to induce a partial collapse of the local credit system 
(Postel Vinay, 1989), thus preventing any smoothing of the crisis. In the absence of welfare 
state, a large share of the population suffered a major income drop.  
The phylloxera crisis started in 1863 when the aphid appeared in Southern France and ended 
in the 1890s when vineyards were replanted with hybrid American vines which were resistant 
to the insect. As phylloxera affected the different départements in different years, we exploit 
spatial variation in the timing of the shock to identify its effect on crime rates. The massive 
negative shock to the French economy induced by the phylloxera attack is indeed an ideal 
natural experiment that helps solving the major identification problems related to reverse 
causality and confounding factors. To the best of our knowledge, the only article exploiting 
the source of exogenous variation in income induced by phylloxera is Banerjee et al. (2010) 
who estimate the effect of the shock in utero and during early childhood on future health 
conditions. 
We use a similar research design to identify how negative income shocks affected local crime 
rates in 19th century France. The very rich data collected by the French administration starting 
from 1826 allow us to identify the impact of the crisis on violent and property crimes, as well 
as on minor offences. This exercise is unique from a historical perspective since comparable 
datasets were collected only starting in the 20th century in other countries (e.g. the Uniform 
crime report in the USA starts being compiled in the 1930s) or for a shorter period of time in 
                                                 
1
 Wine represented on average 17% of agricultural production. 
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some German states like Bavaria and Prussia (see Mehlum et al., 2006 and Traxler and 
Burhop, 2010).  
Our results show that the phylloxera crisis caused a strong increase in property crimes and a 
significant decrease in violent crimes. In particular, the fall in wine production and hence in 
agricultural income induced by the phylloxera attack caused a strong increase in thefts and a 
reduction in homicides.  
This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of negative economic conditions on 
crime in a historical perspective by covering 87 French départements over 1826-1936.2 
Besides being informative for the economics of crime and being one of the very first exercises 
of this kind in economic history, this paper also contributes to the literature in development 
economics to the extent that the economic and demographic structures of 19th century France 
were very similar to those of a developing country (Banerjee et al 2010). 
To the best of our knowledge, only a couple of papers resort to historical data to study the 
impact of changing economic conditions on crime. Mehlum et al. (2006) estimate the impact 
of poverty on crime in 19th century Bavaria. The authors use rainfall as an instrumental 
variable for rye prices and show that an increase in rye prices following bad weather 
conditions induces an increase in property crimes and leads to significantly fewer violent 
crimes. Traxler and Burhop (2010) replicate this exercise for Prussia and find similar results. 
With respect to Mehlum et al. (2006), it is worth noting that despite we cover a similar 
historical period, our research design has a number of advantages. We have observations for 
both our independent and dependent variables for each of the 87 French départements over 
the whole period of analysis. In contrast, Mehlum et al. (2006) use data on crime rates in 
seven Bavarian regions while they only have one single series of rainfall and rye price data 
                                                 
2
 We exclude Meurthe, Meurthe-et-Moselle as well as Moselle from our dataset. Moreover, for 5 of the 87 
départements we have data for a shorter period of time – see Data Appendix.   
 6 
for the whole of Bavaria. Moreover, while rainfall potentially affects both economic 
conditions and the probability of apprehension of criminals – since the cost of searching for 
criminals may be higher if weather conditions are bad –, the phylloxera crisis affects incomes 
while leaving unaltered the cost of crime fighting and hence the probability of apprehension. 
A few papers tackle the impact of a negative income shock on criminal activity in developing 
countries. Miguel (2005) uses survey data on contemporary rural Tanzania to show that the 
killing of “witches” (i.e. old women) increases in times of extreme weather events leading to 
floods and droughts. Fafchamps and Minten (2006) exploit an exogenous cut in fuel supply in 
rural Madagascar following a disputed presidential election to identify the effects of a massive 
increase in poverty and transport costs. Using original survey data collected in 2002 they find 
that crop thefts increase with transitory poverty. Theft thus appears to be used by some of the 
rural poor as a risk coping strategy. 
Our paper relates more indirectly to the recent literature on unemployment and crime in 
contemporary developed countries. These studies using panel data at the state or regional 
level (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould et al., 2002; Oster and Agell, 2007; Lin, 2008; 
Buonanno and Montolio, 2008; Fougère et al., 2009; Mocan and Bali, 2010) reach a 
consensus that increasing unemployment contributes to raise property crimes (although the 
magnitude is not large) and does not significantly affect violent crimes. Our paper also 
investigates the impact of worsening economic conditions on crimes rates, but in a much 
longer historical perspective. It also relates, to some extent, to the literature on the effects of 
the business cycle on crime since the phylloxera crisis constitutes a strong negative shock to 
the French economy. Consistent with our findings, this literature finds that trends in property 
crimes in the USA and France are countercyclical (Cook and Zarkin, 1985 and Lagrange, 
2003). 
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While these papers focus on the effects of poverty and income shocks, other papers 
investigate the effect of structural poverty and inequality on crime. Resorting to cross-country 
comparisons, Fajnzylber et al. (2002) show that differences in crime rates are related to 
growth and poverty. 
The paper develops as follows. Section 2 provides some background information about the 
phylloxera pest and some conceptual background. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy. 
Section 4 describes the data sources and the main trends in crime rates and phylloxera 
diffusion in 19th century France. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 provides some 
conclusions. 
 
2.Historical and Theoretical Background 
2.1.Phylloxera and income shock 
Over the 19th century, France experienced modest but constant economic growth with GDP 
rising from $1,218 in 1820 to $3,452 in 1913.3 While income per capita thus increased by 
about 200%, crime rates decreased quite sharply. Violent crimes declined from 6 per 100,000 
inhabitants in 1826 to 4.3 in 1913, while property crimes precipitated from about 15.9 to 3.4 
per 100,000 over the same period. One candidate explanation for the correlation evidenced by 
Figures 1a-b between declining crime rates and increasing GDP per capita is, of course, the 
existence of a negative relationship between income and crime – Becker (1968). 
At the beginning of the 19th century, France was still a developing country. Agriculture still 
represented a major source of income for many households. The share of agricultural 
production and extractive industry in GDP amounted to 38.5% in 1830, decreased to 33% in 
1850 and was still as high as 28% in 1890 (Craft, 1984, p. 54). This made France much more 
                                                 
3
 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars (see Maddison, 1995).  
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dependent on agriculture than the United-Kingdom, for example, where the corresponding 
shares were respectively 24.9% in 1840 and 13.4% in 1890 (Craft, 1984, p. 53). Wine 
production represented a large part of the value of agricultural production. In 1862, the year 
before phylloxera was first spotted in France, wine production amounted to about one-sixth of 
the value of agricultural production thus representing the second most important product after 
wheat. Any disease affecting French vineyards was therefore likely to represent a major shock 
to a mostly rural economy. Phylloxera turned out to be such a shock. 
"Phylloxera vastatrix" is a near-microscopic aphid that hangs on the roots of vines and sucks 
the sap. It originally lived in North America and did not reach Europe in the era of sailing 
ships since the journey took so long that upon arrival either the vine cuttings or the aphid on 
them had died. The steam power provided the greater speed necessary for the insect to survive 
the journey. Although it was harmless to grape vines in its original ecology, it proved 
devastator to European species, causing their death in a very short while (Simpson, 2011, 
p.36). French vineyards started to be affected in 1863 but it was not before 1868 that scientists 
identified its presence on dead roots in the Gard département. Until 1875, there was a fierce 
scientific debate as to the responsibility of phylloxera in vines death. Some scientists argued 
that it was the cause of the death whereas most of them claimed that it was a consequence of 
it: vines were dying because wine growers would not take good care of them and phylloxera 
was developing on dead vines (Pouget, 1990 and Gale, 2011).  
By the end of the 1860s, the aphid affected most départements in the Southeast of the country 
(Bouches du Rhône) and in the Bordeaux region. From the Southeast, it moved northward and 
from the Bordeaux region it moved northwest. The insect progressively expanded across 
départements and by the end of the 1870s it had affected all wine producing départements in 
Southern France. Its expansion path was very difficult to predict since phylloxera spread 
either because it was carried by the wind or because it was hanging on an object or a plant 
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which was carried around by human activity, including on long distances. Other factors also 
played a role. For example, its expansion in the Charente département was described as 
“nearly explosive” and greatly favoured by the heat and drought of 1875.4 So, even after 1875 
when the origin of the pest was identified, farmers kept being surprised by its arrival in their 
area and sometimes denied it on the grounds that they were taking good care of their vines – 
Ordish, 1972, p. 134; Loubère, 1978, chapter 4.  
During that period, experts experimented various treatments to fight against the pest from 
vineyard flooding to the use of chemical products. None of the treatments introduced proved 
to be effective until a botanist named Alexis Millardet showed in 1882 that vines could be 
made resistant to phylloxera by grafting European vines onto phylloxera-resistant American 
roots. It then took several years before people understood how to implement the grafting in 
order to produce drinkable wine. This was because not all types of US roots were suitable for 
the various types of French soils and wine species. In 1888 Pierre Viala came back from 
America having identified 431 types of American vines and selected those likely to be 
successfully grafted in France. This opened the way to the recovery which started in the early 
1890s.5 
As it spread within and across départements, phylloxera caused a huge decrease in wine 
production: - 32% on average according to Banerjee et al. (2010). As reported by Loubère 
(1978, p. 157), "there was no measure of the despair the southern vintner felt as he watched 
helplessly, obstinately unbelieving, while his vines faded and died".  
The sharp decline in wine production was not compensated by an equally strong increase in 
wine prices. In order to compensate for the decrease in the supply of French wine, French 
authorities relaxed both wine import rules and quality standards. Wine growers were allowed 
                                                 
4
 Gale, 2011, p. 152.  
5
 Paul, 1996, p. 113ff and Gale, 2011, chapter 4.  
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to sell "piquettes" or "second or third wine" – made by mixing press cakes with water, 
pressing it, adding sugar to the run and fermenting. They were also allowed to produce raisin 
wines, a beverage made out by soaking imported dried raisins and drawing off the liquid until 
the exhaustion of all of its sugar (Loubère, 1978, p. 166). According to Ordish (1972, tables 9-
11), the sum of imports, piquettes and raisin wine represented 58.6% of domestic wine 
production in 1889 and 61.5% in 1890 as compared to less than 0.5% in the 1860s.6 This large 
inflow of imports and wine substitutes together with the decrease in average wine quality kept 
the price of wine from increasing at the same pace as the decline in French production 
(Ordish, 1972; Banerjee et al, 2010).  
This generated a major income shock. Contemporary estimates made by A. Lalande suggest 
that phylloxera cost France twice as much as the war indemnity paid to the Germans in 1870 
which amounted to 25% of one-year GDP (see Occhino et al, 2008 and Ordish, 1972). More 
recently, Pierre Galet estimated that the cost could have been as high as 15 billion francs, i.e. 
three times the war indemnity.7 The share of the value of wine production in GDP indeed 
went down from 6.84% in 1862 to 2.71% in 1890 while the share of départements affected by 
phylloxera increased from 0 to 71.3% – see Figure 2.  
This decrease in wine-generated income did not trigger a substantial shift towards other 
agricultural products. The area planted with vines did not significantly decrease subsequent to 
the arrival of phylloxera (see Banerjee et al., 2010). Most areas planted with vines were 
indeed ill suited to other crops. Moreover, wine growers were reluctant to switch from a high 
value-added product to less lucrative crops, such as wheat for example – Loubère (1978, p. 
167). Most of them expected some cure to be found in the near future. Ordish (1972, p. 155) 
                                                 
6
 Imports jumped from 0.2 million hectoliters in the 1860s to 10 millions in the 1880s. As a percentage of 
domestic wine production they rose from 0.3% in 1862 to 40% in 1890. Assessing precisely the volume of 
piquettes is more difficult. A lower bound can be estimated using the volume of sugar mixed with press cakes. 
This has been recorded because this sugar used to be subsidised by the State. Ordish (1972) suggests that 
piquettes could have amounted to 11% of regular wine production. As far as raisin wine is concerned, it 
represented at most 11% of domestic wine production over the period. 
7
 Cited in Simpson (2011), p. 36. 
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even argues that "there was a mystique attached to wine growing felt by the majority of small 
growers who found it difficult to envisage any other way of life".  
Given the size of the income shock in wine producing départements, the credit system itself 
partly collapsed thus preventing farmers from relying on borrowing to smooth out the crisis 
(Postel-Vinay, 1989). Central and local governments would not provide any financial help to 
compensate for the loss of income. Moreover, the only institutions in charge of poor relief, the 
so-called bureaux de bienfaisance, were charities organised on a local community basis which 
found themselves in great difficulty because of the crisis. The British consul at Bordeaux 
noticed in 1886 that "the number, more especially of the smaller class of proprietors on 
Medoc, in Sauterne and other départements of the Gironde who have been utterly ruined is 
considerable".8 Similarly, Arambourou (1958) summarises: "For many peasants, ruin was 
complete; for all of them the financial difficulty was considerable". 
2.2 Income shock and crime 
According to the standard economic model of crime (Becker, 1968), individuals choose 
between criminal and legal activities on the basis of the expected utility of each. Consistently, 
evidence from contemporary data have shown that crime rates respond to falls in the wages of 
unskilled workers causing a variation in the relative utility to engage into legal activities 
(Machin and Meghir, 2004). In a similar way, we expect the income shock brought about by 
phylloxera to have affected the expected utility from illegal activities, and hence crime rates, 
in several respects. 
First it decreased the quantity and quality of legitimate earnings opportunities, thereby 
reducing the opportunity cost of illegal behaviour. At the same time, phylloxera also reduced 
the quality and quantity of wine production potentially targeted by criminals, thereby reducing 
the gains from crime. So phylloxera has modified the relative gains from legal versus illegal 
                                                 
8
 Cited in Ordish, 1972, p. 146.  
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activities in a potentially ambiguous way. The rest of the paper aims at assessing the causal 
impact of the income shock generated by phylloxera on crime rates. 
However the decision to engage in criminal activity does not only depend on the relative gains 
from criminal and non-criminal activities. It also depends on the probability of apprehension 
and on the severity of court sentences. Both may have been affected by the income shock 
generated by phylloxera.  
Local tax revenues may have decreased following the fall in income, triggering a reduction in 
the number of police forces and/or in their endowments. This may, in turn, have reduced the 
probability of apprehending criminals. However, such a reduction in the number of police 
forces is not very likely to have taken place. The number and availability of police forces was 
indeed mainly determined at the national level so that it was not very sensitive to local 
economic conditions. Nonetheless, we control for the local presence of police forces in some 
specifications in order to make sure that this does not bias our results. These are not our 
preferred estimates to the extent that police forces are, of course, likely to be endogenous. 
The severity of court sentences may also have decreased if judges became more lenient 
because they were conscious that making a living out of legal income opportunities had 
become more difficult.9 In order to make sure that our results on crime rates are not driven by 
a greater leniency of judges in hard times, we run some robustness checks in which we check 
that phylloxera did not significantly affect conviction rates. 
 
3. Empirical framework 
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that phylloxera affected different départements in 
different years. The exogeneity of the variation of the phylloxera spread with respect to crime 
                                                 
9
 Ichino et al. (2003), for instance, show that Italian labour judges are more likely to decide in favour of workers 
whenever local unemployment is higher. 
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is central to our strategy. Ideally we would regress crime rates on département-level income, 
instrumenting the latter with an indicator of phylloxera – as defined in section 4 – in order to 
identify the effect of the induced income shock on both property and violent crime rates as 
well as minor offences. However income data do not exist at the département level for 19th 
century France.  
As an alternative strategy we estimate the reduced form relation between phylloxera and 
crime rates for the 87 French départements for the period from 1826 to 1936 – except war 
years.  
We first check that phylloxera did actually reduce wine production, running the following 
regression of the log of wine production on a phylloxera indicator:  
 
where Wineij denotes wine production in département i at year j, pij is our phylloxera 
indicator, tj and di represent year and département fixed effects respectively, while sij is a 
département time-specific trend and εij is an error term. In all specifications, standard errors 
are clustered at the département level.   
As a second step, we assess the impact of phylloxera on crime rates by estimating the 
following equation:  
 
where Cij is the crime rate in département i during year j. Depending on the specification Cij 
represents either property or violent crimes, minor offences or some sub-category of crimes 
such as theft and murder. 
Since the impact of the crisis might have been stronger in areas highly dependent on wine 
production, we also check whether the impact of phylloxera on crime rates varies according to 
the importance of wine-growing in the department in 1862, i.e. prior to the arrival of 
phylloxera. The equation we estimate is then:  
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where  denotes the importance of wine-growing in département i as of 1862.  
In some specifications we add a set of département-level socio-demographic controls or a 
measure of the importance of police forces (Xij). The corresponding equation is: 
 
Finally we check that phylloxera did not affect the leniency of courts by regressing conviction 
rates CRij on our phylloxera indicator: 
 
 
4. Data  
4.1 Crime and police forces 
Since the very beginning of the 19th century, the French judicial system was highly 
centralized. France was a Roman-law country where the Napoleonic codes were the basis of 
criminal and civil law (Carbasse, 2000). Starting in 1826, the French Ministry of Justice 
published a statistical yearbook entitled the Compte Général de la Justice Criminelle. It was 
based on reporting by local court public prosecutors and clerks. We hand-collected data from 
this source. 
The Compte Général was one of the most continuous and reliable sources in France at that 
time. It has been used as a model to set up criminal statistical records in several countries (see 
Perrot and Robert, 1989). Since its first publication, the Compte was assigned a double role. It 
was a management tool that was designed to help the government assess the working of the 
law and the effects of legal reforms. But, beyond policy makers, it was also supposed to 
provide information to moralists and thinkers. As such it contributed to the birth of 
criminology. Despite the Compte was published yearly until 1982, we only collected data for 
the period from 1826 to 1936. As underlined by Perrot and Robert (1989) the quality of the 
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data indeed declined after the 1930s, in particular due to the decrease in the funding awarded 
to the judiciary system to collect statistical information. 
The Compte provides detailed information on the number of people charged and acquitted of 
violent crimes, property crimes and minor offences in each département every year (see 
Figure 3 for crimes – a similar table is available for minor offences). Violent crimes include 
homicides, sexual assaults, injuries, violence against children, abortion, plotting, rebellion and 
false witnesses. Property crimes encompass thefts, counterfeiting, corruption, destruction, 
fires and pillaging. We also have data on the number of people accused of a number of more 
precisely defined crimes such as: homicides, thefts in churches, on country roads, domestic 
thefts and other thefts. Using the population provided by the Census10 for each département, 
we compute yearly crime rates defined as the ratio of the number of people accused to the 
population, broken down by type of crimes and offences, in each département over 1826-
1936. Given the poor quality of population data during war years, we drop years 1870-71 and 
1914-1918 from our sample (see Data appendix).  
As illustrated on Figures 4 and 5, violent and property crimes decreased sharply over the 
century whereas minor offences remained roughly constant. These general trends are taken 
into account by including year fixed effects in our regressions.  
We also compute conviction rates for each type of crime and offence by dividing the number 
of people convicted by the number of people accused in each département every year. The 
corresponding rates vary from 64% for violent crimes to 72% for property crimes and 91% for 
minor offences – see Appendix Table A1.  
Finally, The Compte also provides information on police forces. More precisely, we know the 
yearly number of urban and rural policemen, superintendents, forest wardens and guardsmen 
                                                 
10
 Census data are available every five years only. In order to get yearly data for population at the département 
level, we interpolate Census data using growth rates of population between Census years - see Data appendix.  
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in each court-of-appeal jurisdiction between 1843 and 1932.11 We compute an indicator of the 
presence of police forces defined as the ratio of the total number of police forces divided by 
the population in each court-of-appeal jurisdiction. Over the period we study, there were on 
average 3 members of police forces for 1,000 inhabitants in France (see Appendix Table A1).  
4.2. Phylloxera 
We build a département-year varying indicator of the presence of phylloxera. Since our 
objective is to capture the timing of the shock to the local economy caused by the aphid, and 
because the time span it took the insect to spread out and negatively affect wine crops 
strongly varied across départements, it cannot be captured by a single lag structure. Galet, 
(1957) provides information on the year when phylloxera was first spotted in at least one 
municipality of each département and the year when the département was fully affected. We 
exploit this information as follows. For each département we define year a as the year when 
the aphid was first spotted and year b as the full-contagion year, that is the year when all 
arrondissements – subdivisions of départements – were affected by phylloxera.  
We then define the phylloxera indicator pij for département i at year j as a variable taking 
values: 
 
The phylloxera indicator thus takes value 1/(b-a+1) the first year the aphid is spotted in the 
département. It then grows at rate 1/(b-a+1) until year b when the whole département is 
affected. pij then takes value 1 until 1890, when the solution to the disease was implemented 
on the entire French territory. Let's take the example of the Gard département. Phylloxera was 
first spotted there in 1863 and the whole département was completely affected in 1878. In this 
                                                 
11
 The data are actually available at the court (i.e. infra-département) level for 1843-1862, at the département 
level for 1879-1885 and at the court-of-appeal level for 1863-1878 and 1886-1932. We aggregate them at the 
court-of-appeal level for all years between 1843 and 1932. There were 27 courts of appeal in France in 1826. 
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case pij takes value 0.0625 in 1863, 0.125 in 1864 etc. until 1878 when it takes value 1 up to 
1890. This definition of pij takes into account that the aphid spread out at a different pace in 
the various départements thus taking a variable amount of time to fully affect wine production 
and hence income.12 
As shown by Figure 2, phylloxera had been spotted in 3.3% of the 87 French départements in 
1865 whereas this figure amounted to 50.5% in 1880 and 71.3% in 1890. The first 
département to be totally affected by phylloxera was Vaucluse in 1875. This was the case of 
17% of all départements in 1880.  
4.3. Wine production, wine intensity and farm size 
Data on wine production are drawn from Galet (1957). In our dataset, the number of 
hectolitres of wine produced is available for all départements between 1850 and 1905. Wine 
was produced in 79 out of the 87 French départements in 1862 – i.e. the year before 
phylloxera was first spotted in France.  
Using information provided by the 1862 Agriculture Survey, we compute a couple of 
measures of wine intensity in the various départements before phylloxera was first spotted in 
France. We first compute the share of wine in agricultural production as of 1862: it is larger 
than 15% in 39 départements. We also use data on the surface planted in vines per inhabitant 
in 1862: the French average is as high as 0.07 ha (see Appendix Table A1). Eventually, we 
compute the average farm size in each département in 1862: it is equal to 0.75 ha. We use 
these variables in specifications in which we allow the impact of phylloxera on crime rates to 
                                                 
12
 Banerjee et al. (2010) use an alternative strategy to overcome the lack of common lag structure capturing the 
time span taken by the insect to spread out. They define a phylloxera indicator which takes value 1 when 
phylloxera has been spotted in the département and wine production is at least 20% lower than in the last pre-
phylloxera year. Despite all our results are robust to this specification (available upon request) this does not 
appear as an appropriate solution in our case since wine production might be directly affected by crime rates thus 
introducing a reverse causality bias. 
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vary according to the importance of wine-related activities and/or farm size in each 
département as of 1862. 
4.4 Control variables 
We include socio-demographic controls in some robustness checks. Using the data from the 
Statistique Générale de la France available since 1851, we compute the ratio of males in the 
département population. We also control for the age structure of the male population, i.e. the 
ratio of males aged 15-19, 20-29, 30-39 and 40 years old and above. Since these data come 
from the Census which is available every 5 years only, we regress a 5-year moving average of 
crime rates on a 5-year moving average of our phylloxera indicator and the socio-
demographic variables.13 
We use a similar specification when controlling for urbanization. The data come from the 
INED-Urbanisation database and are also available for Census years only.14 We compute the 
proportion of people living in towns with more than 2,500 inhabitants – which is the standard 
definition of a town in France (see Pumain and Guérin-Pace, 1990) - and the proportion of 
people living in the 3 largest cities in the département. We control alternatively for each of 
these two measures of urbanisation in order to make sure that our results are not due to 
changes in the urban structure of the French départements that would be correlated with the 
presence of phylloxera. Descriptive statistics of these variables are provided in Appendix 
Table A1. 
 
                                                 
13
 The 5-year moving averages are computed around census years.  
14
 See Pumain and Riandey (1986) for a thorough description of the data. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Phylloxera and wine production 
Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that phylloxera generated a sharp drop in wine 
production. We first check that this has actually been the case – see equation (1). Results are 
reported in Table 1. During the phylloxera crisis, wine production is dramatically affected and 
it falls by about 30% in an average year of full phylloxera contagion with respect to the period 
of absence of phylloxera in the affected départements.15 In wine-intensive départements, 
defined as those départements where wine production amounted to at least 15% of 
agricultural production in 1862, the result is even stronger since we observe a drop of wine 
production of about 40 per cent in the full-phylloxera period with respect to non-phylloxera 
years.  
These results show that the phylloxera pest provides an ideally strong exogenous shock on 
wine production. It is worth noting here that with respect to using meteorological variables, 
phylloxera not only has the advantage of not having an impact on deterrence costs but it 
plausibly provides a stronger shock on wine production than variations in meteorological 
variables (Chevet, Lecocq and Visser, 2011).  
Figures 6a-b provide some preliminary evidence that the economic crisis brought about by the 
fall in wine production following the diffusion of phylloxera caused an increase in some types 
of crimes. We report trends in differences in crime rates between wine-intensive and non-
wine-intensive départements along with wine production. Figure 6a suggests that property 
crimes rose more in wine-intensive than in non-wine-intensive départements when wine 
production declined. This has been particularly true during the phylloxera period. In contrast, 
the gap is not quite as striking for violent crimes. The rest of this section provides direct 
estimates of the impact of phylloxera on crime rates. 
                                                 
15
 These results are in line with Banerjee et al. (2010) who find a 35 per cent drop in wine production using a 
different indicator of phylloxera. 
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5.2. Phylloxera and crime: baseline results
 
In Table 2, we report the results obtained when estimating the model presented in equation 
(2). All specifications include time and département dummies along with département-
specific time trends and standard errors are clustered at the département level. Columns (1) to 
(3) report the results for aggregate crime categories. As evidenced in column (2) phylloxera 
had a positive and significant impact on property crimes. Moving from the absence of 
phylloxera to full contagion increased property crime rates by 1.655 per thousand points, i.e. 
an average 22%. This suggests that the negative impact of phylloxera on legal earnings 
opportunities dominated its potential damage to the quality of illegal activities. Despite we do 
not have data on unemployment for 19th century France, these results are consistent with 
papers showing that the quality and quantity of legitimate employment opportunities are pro-
cyclical and negatively related to crime rates (see Cook and Zarkin, 1985, and Mocan and 
Bali, 2010).  
Interestingly, the opposite effect is found for violent crimes – see column (1): full contagion 
by phylloxera reduced violent crime rates by about 13%. This result is consistent with Traxler 
and Burhop's (2010) who showed for 19th century Germany that when rainfalls used to be 
particularly strong thereby generating an increase in rye prices – used to produce beer -, 
violent crimes went down. However, this negative effect vanishes once accounted for beer 
consumption. Together with our results, this suggests that, when hit by a negative income 
shock, people reduce their consumption, including that of alcoholic drinks. As a consequence, 
they engage less often in violent behaviour. As underlined by Melhum et al. (2006), "this is 
the likely channel that reduces violent crime".16 In contrast, phylloxera does not seem to have 
affected minor offences: the coefficient on the phylloxera variable is positive but insignificant 
at conventional levels. 
                                                 
16
 Melhum et al. (2006) p. 373. 
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Evidence regarding more disaggregated types of crimes is consistent with these initial 
findings – columns (4) to (9). The impact of phylloxera on homicides was negative, although 
not quite significant. In contrast, phylloxera increased the number of thefts per inhabitant – 
see column (5). This was essentially driven by an increase in the number of thefts in churches, 
thefts on country roads and a residual category including, among others, violent thefts.  
In order to better understand the role of local structures of agricultural production in our 
findings, we run difference-in-difference estimates in which we compare the impact of 
phylloxera in départements where wine growing represented a large proportion of economic 
activity and in départements where this was not the case – and similarly for départements 
with large vs. small farm size – see equation (3) and Table 3. More specifically, we interact 
our phylloxera indicator with the share of wine in agricultural production in 1862 on the one 
hand - columns (1) to (3) - and with the area planted in vine per inhabitant in 1862 on the 
other hand - columns (4) to (6). This first set of results suggests that phylloxera had a larger 
impact on property crimes in départements where wine initially represented a large share of 
agricultural production. We also find a significant differential effect of phylloxera on minor 
offences in wine-intensive départements: the interaction between phylloxera and the share of 
wine in agricultural production is positive and significant at the 1% level, while the 
interaction with the area planted in vines is significant at the 10% level. In contrast, the 
negative effect of phylloxera on violent crimes does not seem to vary according to the 
importance of wine in the local pre-phylloxera economy. 
As a next step, we interact phylloxera with the average farm size in each département as of 
1862. As shown in columns (8) and (9), the interaction term is positive and strongly 
significant both for property crimes and minor offences. This suggests that the effect of 
phylloxera was stronger in départements where farms were on average larger. One plausible 
explanation for this finding is that wherever farms were large, wine growers employed many 
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workers. When phylloxera hit those départements and destroyed the vineyards, workers lost 
their job, which left them without any income. In contrast, in regions with smaller farms, 
salaried workers were fewer. Phylloxera strongly affected the small independent winegrowers 
but it is likely that their means of support did not go down to an absolute zero since they 
owned some land and could partially hedge against the income shock caused by phylloxera by 
growing crops for self-consumption. So, the number of people ending up into absolute 
poverty was presumably larger in large-farm areas. If increases in property crime and minor 
offence rates were triggered by the lack of legal earnings opportunities, this may account for 
their larger increase in large-farm départements.  
Taken together, these results show that the negative income shock induced by the phylloxera 
crisis strongly affected French crime rates. It caused a substantial increase in property crimes 
while inducing a decrease in violent crimes probably due to the reduction in alcohol 
consumption.17 These results suggest that, in the absence of a safety net provided by the 
welfare state and given that the credit market itself was affected, engaging in property crime 
turned out to be a way, for the French rural population, to cope with the negative economic 
consequences of the phylloxera crisis.  
5.3. Robustness Checks 
In the previous section, we provided evidence that the diffusion of phylloxera was associated 
with an increase in property crime rates and a decrease in violent crimes. We have maintained 
that the main channel driving our results is a negative shock on the income of people whose 
main source of revenue was related to wine production.  
In order to make sure that phylloxera does not capture the effect of other time-varying factors, 
one may want to include a number of control variables. Socio-demographic controls are 
                                                 
17
 This explanation is consistent with evidence reported in other studies showing a positive correlation between 
alcohol consumption and crime, e.g. Cook and Moore (1993) and Carpenter and Dobkin (2011). 
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natural candidates. Such variables are available for Census years only – see Data Section – so 
that we re-estimate our baseline equation for 5-year moving averages computed around 
Census years – see equation (4). As a first step, we check that this new specification does not 
modify our results. As evidenced in Table 4 - Panel A - columns (1) to (3) – our results are 
unchanged: moving from no-phylloxera to full contagion increases property crimes and 
reduces violent crimes in a significant way. Introducing controls for the share of males in the 
département population and for the age structure of the male population – see Panel A, 
columns (4) to (6) – yields virtually identical results. This is not much of a surprise given that, 
in order to bias our results, socio-demographic factors should have been correlated both with 
crime rates and with the expansion of phylloxera, which was indeed quite unlikely.  
Urbanisation may be a more serious concern if its intensity varied a lot across départements. 
Panel B of Table 4 controls alternatively for the share of the département population living in 
towns larger than 2,500 inhabitants – the standard definition of towns in France (see Section 
4) – and the proportion living in the three largest cities in the département. Both specifications 
leave our results unchanged: phylloxera still increases property crimes and reduces violent 
crimes.  
According to our interpretation, the positive effect of phylloxera on property crime rates is 
due to the deterioration of the quality and quantity of labour opportunities which induced a 
number of people to increase their amount of illegal activities with respect to legal ones. An 
alternative mechanism consistent with our results would be related to the response of the 
criminal justice system to crime. Reduced national and local tax collection during bad times 
may result in reduced budgets for police forces and a subsequent reduction in the capacity of 
the criminal justice system to contain crime. In order to control for this potential alternative 
mechanism we include police forces measured at the court-of-appeal level in our regression. 
Results are reported in Table 5. The coefficients on property and violent crimes are essentially 
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unaltered with respect to the baseline results. This suggests that police forces are unlikely to 
have been endogenous, which is consistent with the fact that their allocation was mainly 
determined at the national level. This test allows us ruling out that our results are driven by a 
radical change in the presence of police forces at the local level as a consequence of the 
phylloxera crisis. 
A second potential alternative mechanism through which the phylloxera crisis could have 
affected crime rates is the behaviour of judges. During bad times, judges and juries could be 
more lenient toward those committing property crimes as they might justify misbehaviour as a 
consequence of the need to survive. If this were the case, the overall deterrence of the 
criminal justice system would be reduced as a consequence of the phylloxera attack. Note that 
in order for changes in leniency to account for our findings, judges should also have become 
tougher to people committing violent crimes. In order to check for this alternative 
explanation, we re-run our baseline equation for conviction rates as a dependent variable. 
Results provided in Table 6 show that our phylloxera indicator does not significantly predict 
conviction rates for violent and property crimes. As such, more lenient or tougher judges are 
not likely to account for our main results. 
As evidenced in column (3), things are quite different for minor offences: the coefficient on 
the phylloxera indicator is positive and significant. The deterrence effect generated by this 
change in judges' behaviour may account for the fact that, despite the negative income shock 
brought about by phylloxera, we do not see any increase in minor offences. The difference we 
find for conviction rates between minor offences and crimes may be explained by some 
institutional characteristics of the French judicial system. Violent and property crimes were 
judged by criminal courts in which juries were composed of randomly drawn registered voters 
who decided both on guiltiness and mitigating circumstances while professional judges were 
responsible for deciding sentences. In contrast, for minor offences, both jurors and court 
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presidents were professional judges - appointed by the Ministry of Justice - who may have 
tried to counterbalance the potential effect of local economic conditions on minor offences.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper studies the effects of a large negative economic shock on crime using a unique 
dataset based on 19th century French administrative crime records at the département level. 
Our results show that the phylloxera crisis generated a 22% increase in property crime rates, 
plausibly driven by the impact of phylloxera on the economic conditions of those living in the 
affected départements. These results are robust to various alternative explanations including 
possible changes in the criminal justice system or in the local presence of police forces 
following the phylloxera crisis. Our findings are consistent with the standard economic model 
of crime and suggest that property crimes, and in particular thefts, may have been used by 
some of the French rural population in the 19th century as a risk coping strategy.   
Moreover, we show that the diffusion of phylloxera brought about a substantial decrease in 
violent crime rates (- 13%) consistent with the idea that the income shock induced a drop in 
alcohol consumption. This finding is in line with results by Melhum et al. (2006) and Traxler 
and Burhop (2010) who provide evidence of a reduction in violent crimes following the fall in 
beer consumption brought about by bad rye crops in 19th century German states.  
Despite it is very difficult to draw policy conclusions from an exercise not designed to test the 
effect of a specific policy, our findings are consistent with the idea that an insurance 
mechanism against negative income shocks may prevent the latter from generating a strong 
increase in property crime rates. These conclusions are in line with the implications of other 
studies focusing on developing countries today. In particular, Miguel (2005) concludes that in 
order to reduce the number of old women homicides induced as a response to an increase in 
poverty after extreme weather events in rural Tanzania it would be desirable to improve both 
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the insurance system against extreme rain falls and provide pensions to people in extreme 
poverty. Of course, as also discussed by Miguel (2005), an alternative solution could be to 
increase deterrence. Our results on minor offences suggest that this could be done by ensuring 
that judges become tougher when economic conditions deteriorate. However this solution 
may be difficult to implement if judges are truly independent. Moreover, an increase in the 
severity of sentences could be particularly costly since it could trigger an increase in 
incarceration rates. 
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Figure 1 – Violent crimes, property crimes and GDP per capita 
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Source: authors' computations from Compte Général de la Justice Criminelle, 
Annuaire Statistique de la France and Maddison (1995).  
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Source: authors' computations from Compte Général de la Justice Criminelle, 
Annuaire Statistique de la France and Maddison (1995).  
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Figure 2. Phylloxera and Share of Wine Production in GDP, 1862-1890 
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Source: authors' computations from Annuaire Statistique de la France (1946), Toutain 
(1987) and Galet (1957) Statistique de la France and Maddison (1995).  
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Figure 3 - Compte Général de la Justice Criminelle, 1869 
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Figure 4 – Violent and Property Crimes in France 1826-1936 
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Figure 5 – Minor Offences in France 1826-1936 
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Figure 6: Differences in Crime Rates between Wine-Producing  
and Non Wine-Producing Départements 
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6-b. Property Crimes 
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 Note: Wine-intensive départements are defined as départements in which 
wine production represented at least 15% of agricultural production in 1862. 
All other départements are defined as non-wine-intensive 
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TABLE 1 
IMPACT OF PHYLLOXERA ON WINE PRODUCTION 
  
Log (Wine Production) 
 
Whole sample 
Wine-intensive 
départements 
Phylloxera -0.305** -0.398* 
  (0.139) (0.214) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Département Dummies Yes Yes 
Département Specific Trends  Yes Yes 
 
  
 
R-squared 0.918 0.790 
Observations 3,866 1,860 
Notes: (1) Wine-intensive départements are defined as départements in which wine production represented at 
least 15% of agricultural production in 1862. (2) Robust standard errors clustered at département level in 
parenthesis. (3) **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level 
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TABLE 2 
IMPACT OF PHYLLOXERA ON CRIME RATES 
  
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences Homicides 
All  
Thefts 
Thefts in 
Churches 
Thefts on 
Country 
Roads 
Domestic 
Thefts 
Other 
Thefts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Phylloxera -0.635*** 1.655*** 19.328 -0.102 0.841** 0.036* 0.056* 0.117 0.621** 
  (0.235) (0.572) (33.903) (0.072) (0.330) (0.020) (0.033) (0.105) (0.277) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Département Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Département Specific Trends  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.673 0.775 0.737 0.674 0.761 0.101 0.203 0.706 0.704 
Observations 8639 8639 8639 7038 7038 7038 7038 7038 7038 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. (2)  *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% 
level. (3) In each crime category, dependent variables are defined as the number of charged individuals over the total département population in a given year. 
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TABLE 3 
IMPACT OF PHYLLOXERA ON CRIME RATES  
  
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Phylloxera -0.798** 0.524 -51.169 -0.640* 0.780 -35.317 -0.769** 0.682 -33.881 
 (0.307) (0.726) (45.465) (0.375) (0.741) (48.155) (0.335) (0.614) (39.023) 
Phylloxera*Share of wine in 0.694 4.811** 299.899***       
agricultural production (0.800) (2.247) (113.659)       
Phylloxera*Hectares of vines    0.038 6.591 411.602*    
per inhabitant    (1.839) (4.163) (215.45)    
Phylloxera*Farm size       0.114 0.832** 45.524** 
       (0.142) (0.380) (18.356) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Département Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Département Specific Trends  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
    
          
R-squared 0.673 0.776 0.738 0.673 0.775 0.737 0.673 0.776 0.737 
Observations 8639 8639 8639 8639 8639 8639 8639 8639 8639 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. (2) *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, 
*significant at the 10% level. (3) In each crime category, dependent variables are defined as the number of charged individuals over the total 
département population in a given year. (4) Farm size measured in hectares. 
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TABLE 4 
IMPACT OF PHYLLOXERA ON CRIME RATES CONTROLLING FOR SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
STRUCTURE AND URBANISATION 
(5-year moving averages) 
 
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes Minor Offences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: with socio-demographic controls 
  
 
Phylloxera -0.676** 1.169** -12.200 -0.679** 1.187** -16.019 
 (0.298) (0.537) (31.022) (0.295) (0.537) (30.841) 
Socio-demographic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Département Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Département Specific Trends  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.791 0.848 0.791 0.791 0.849 
 
0.792 
Observations 1332 1332 1332 1332 1332 
 
1332 
Panel B: with socio-demographic controls + urbanization 
  
 
Phylloxera -0.678** 1.188** -15.891 -0.675** 1.189** -15.434 
 (0.290) (0.535) (30.536) (0.292) (0.536) (30.376) 
Socio-demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proportion of people in  Yes Yes Yes No No No 
towns>2,500       
Proportion of people in 3 No No No Yes Yes Yes 
largest towns in département       
      
 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Département Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Département Specific Trends  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.792 0.849 0.792 0.792 0.849 
 
0.793 
Observations 1332 1332 1332 1332 1332 
 
1332 
      
 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. (2) *** significant at the 1% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. (3) In each crime category, dependent variables are defined as 
the number of charged individuals over the total département population. (4) Crime and phylloxera variables are 
measured as 5-year moving averages around the Census years for which we have information on socio-demographic 
variables and urbanisation. (5) Socio-demographic controls include the proportion of males in the whole département 
population and the age structure of the male population (aged 15-19, 20-29, 30-39 years old and 40 years old and above). 
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TABLE 5 
IMPACT OF PHYLLOXERA ON CRIME RATES CONTROLLING FOR 
POLICE FORCES 
  
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Phylloxera -0.473** 1.218** -4.322 
  (0.235) (0.499) (28.055) 
Police Forces  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Département Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Département Specific Trends  Yes Yes Yes 
        
R-squared 0.663 0.723 0.767 
Observations 6896 6896 6896 
Notes: (1) Standard errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. (2) *** significant at the 
1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level.(3) In each crime category, 
dependent variables are defined as the number of charged individuals over the total département 
population in a given year. (4) Police forces are defined as the ratio of the total number of police 
forces to the population in each court-of-appeal jurisdiction. 
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TABLE 6 
IMPACT OF PHYLLOXERA ON CONVICTION RATES 
  
Violent 
Crimes 
Property 
Crimes 
Minor 
Offences 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Phylloxera -0.342 0.966 1.114*** 
  (1.139) (1.247) (0.371) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Département Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Département Specific Trends  Yes Yes Yes 
        
R-squared 0.319 0.218 0.842 
Observations 8585 8447 8639 
Notes: (1) Standard errors clustered at the département level in parenthesis. (2) *** significant at 
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. (3) In each crime 
category, dependent variables are defined as the number of convicted individuals over the number 
of charged individuals for that kind of offence in a given year. 
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TABLE A1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable   Number of Observations Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
    
Crime Rates (per 100,000 Habitants)       
  Violent Crimes 8847 4 .952 4.280 
  Property Crimes 8847 7.397 6.918 
  Minor offences 8847 537.890 355.771 
  Homicides  8847 1.376 2.757 
  All Thefts 8847 5.194 5.530 
  Thefts in churches 7208 0.109 0.271 
  Thefts on country roads 7718 0.235 0.464 
  Domestic thefts 7718 1.225 1.787 
  Other thefts 7718 4.104 3.938 
          
Conviction rates    
Violent crimes 8791 64.450 19.138 
Property crimes 8648 71.627 18.058 
Minor offences 8847 90.758 6.545 
    
Police forces per inhabitant 7080 0.003 0.001 
    
Phylloxera spread 8639 0.070 0.237 
    
Wine Production (in Hl) 3959 534,184 1,134,147 
Share of wine in agricultural production 9048 0.151 0.143 
Area planted in vines per inhabitant (in hectares) 9048 0.073 0.086 
Average farm size (in hectares) 9048 0.753 0.900 
     
Socio-demographic controls    
% males in the population 1461 0.494 0.016 
% males aged 15-19 years old 1461 0.084 0.014 
% males aged 20-29 years old 1461 0.154 0.023 
% males aged 30-39 years old 1461 0.137 0.018 
% males aged 40 years old and above 1461 0.357 0.046 
     
Urbanisation rates 
% of population living in towns >2,500 
inhabitants 1930 27.583 18.375 
% of population living in one of the 3 
largest towns in the département. 1930 20.235 17.001 
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Data Appendix 
 
1. French départements 
In 1826 there were 86 départements the borders of which were defined during the French 
revolution. The main changes which took place between 1826 and 1936 were the following. 
In 1860 three new départements were created with pieces of land coming from the duchy of 
Savoy and the Nice county: Savoie, Haute-Savoie and Alpes Maritimes. They are included in 
our database from 1861 onward. 
In 1871 France lost the war against Prussia. The two Alsatian départements (Haut-Rhin and 
Bas-Rhin) became German as well as part of both the Meurthe and the Moselle. The parts of 
Meurthe and Moselle which remained French were merged into a new département called 
Meurthe-et-Moselle. As a result of World War I, the territory which had become German in 
1871 went back to France. A new département was created with the German part of Meurthe 
and Moselle and was called Moselle. Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin are included in our database 
from 1826 to 1869 and from 1919 to 1936. Given the impossibility to compare Meurthe, 
Meurthe-et-Moselle and Moselle over time we drop them from our data.  
The Belfort area was part of the Haut-Rhin département before 1871. Administratively, it 
became part of Haute-Saône from 1871 to 1922. It then became an independent département 
in 1922 under the name of Territoire de Belfort. Given this historical instability, we drop it 
from our data.  
 
2. Population 
The population of each département comes from the Census which is available for years 
1831, 1836, 1841, 1846, 1851, 1856, 1861, 1866, 1872, 1876, 1881, 1886, 1891, 1896, 1901, 
1906, 1911, 1912, 1921, 1926, 1931 and 1936. 
We compute yearly population by linearly interpolating observed population using the 
population growth rate between two consecutive Census years. Years with wars fought on the 
French territory are dropped (1870-1871 and 1914-1918). For years between Census and 
wars, we proceed in the following way. For years 1867 to 1869 and for 1913, we extrapolate 
the last Census population using the growth rate of the previous inter-Census period. For 
years 1872 to 1875 and 1920-21, we retropolate the next Census population using the growth 
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rate of the following inter-Census period. The 1830 and 1848 revolutions had no noticeable 
impact on département populations.  
 
3. Crime data 
Crime data come from the Compte Général de la Justice Criminelle. They are available for all 
years between 1826 and 1936 except for the period from 1914 to 1918. For Haut-Rhin and 
Bas-Rhin, crime data become available again after WWI in 1925.  
